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Abstract 
This article offers an outline of a pragmatic sociology of the book. Whilst ubiquitous, 
books have received relatively little attention from sociologists. I propose to remedy 
this situation by drawing upon the ideas of G.H. Mead, namely his neo-Hegelian 
theory of the subject-object relationship. Mead’s chief insight is that objects such as 
books are first social and only then physical entities. They have agency not because of 
their thing-ness, so to speak, but because of their sociality. After reviewing the 
existing literature on the book, I discuss Mead’s most relevant contributions. In the 
proposal for a pragmatic sociology of the book that follows, I combine pragmatism’s 
focus upon the materiality of meaning-production with genealogy’s concern with 
power and violence. I conclude with an illustration of the approach: the simultaneous 
decanonization of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America among sociologists today and 
its canonization in political science.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1604 what would eventually become one of the classics of world literature was 
printed by Juan de Cuesta in his workshop in Madrid. As the first edition of Don 
Quixote sold out, several other editions rapidly followed. Cervantes’ novel was 
reprinted no less than nine times in its first decade of existence alone. Featuring the 
iconic characters of Quixote himself, his squire Sancho Panza, the horse Rocinante, 
and his beloved Dolcinea, the countless reprints and translations of intervening 
centuries have seen this great tale attain and consolidate its position in the literary 
canon. It was already as an uncontested literary classic that Don Quixote found its 
way into the hands of a little boy by the name of Jorge, in early twentieth century 
Buenos Aires. Perhaps as a result of contact with the book, this boy grew to become 
one of the greatest novelists of the twentieth century. Jorge Luis Borges’ childhood 
copy of Don Quixote, one of the books of his life, was the Garnier edition with its 
distinctive illustrations: ‘red binding and the titles in gold lettering’ (Borges 1999:26). 
When confronted with another edition of the same book, Borges recalls: ‘I had the 
feeling that it was not the real Don Quixote. Later, a friend obtained for me the 
Garnier edition with the same illustrations, the same footnotes and the same errata’. 
‘For me’, Borges concludes: ‘all these things were part of the book; for me, it was the 
real Don Quixote’1.  
 Borges’ childhood memories, a sort of feeling consciousness, provide a 
particularly fitting illustration of this paper’s central aim, which is to present the 
outline of a pragmatic approach to books as sociological objects. Of course, writing 
about the book at a time when some fear sociology books are being killed off by an 
audit culture that prioritizes the writing of journal articles may look like an odd 
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choice.
2
 However, confronted with the available evidence, fears over the death of the 
book seem somewhat exaggerated.
3
 Yet the sociological examination of the death and 
life of the book, in an epoch when its content is supported by a myriad forms, has 
never been more relevant.  
 I propose to inquire into the dialectic between content and form from a 
pragmatic perspective. By a ‘pragmatic’ approach, I mean one which affirms that no 
text exists outside of the materialities that propose it to its readers or listeners, as 
opposed to a Platonist perspective which postulates that a work transcends all of its 
possible material incarnations.
4
 Within sociology, pragmatism has experienced a 
spectacular revival in recent years. What had been for many years a more or less 
obscure philosophical school, whose naturalistic neo-Hegelian origins and general 
orientation to inter-subjective meaning-making processes (maxime linguistic 
communication) increased its appeal among philosophical circles, has enjoyed a 
spectacular revival in the work of a new generation of social thinkers interested in 
questioning the humanistic premises of modern social thought.
5
 At the heart of this 
debate is the question of how the social sciences deal with the human and non-human. 
Do we have good reason to grant human beings a privileged epistemological position, 
the traditional humanistic perspective, or should we approach people and things 
symmetrically, as post- or anti-humanists suggest?
6
 My answer is neither. I am 
interested in exploring the social lives of things in order to better understand how 
people operate, for I believe that meaning is produced in a process of mutual 
constitution between people and the world around them, including physical objects. 
This insight, which can be traced back to classical American pragmatism, sets my 
approach apart from traditional humanism, as well as from most current post-
humanist proposals. Traditional humanism, developed around notions of ‘man’ or ‘the 
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human condition’, is hopelessly metaphysical. Insofar as it aims to replace the 
humanist emphasis upon the person with a symmetrical relation between persons and 
things, post-humanism incurs two basic errors. First, by granting the same 
epistemological privilege to things that humanists grant humans, post-humanists fail 
to see the obvious, that it is humans who make sense of the social lives of things. Put 
simply, there is no point of view of things apart from our point of view of the point of 
view of things (see e.g. Hodder 2012:10). Second, post-humanists risk perpetuating 
the antinomies of humanist thought. Rather than a flat symmetry between human and 
non-human entities, one should be aiming at a better understanding of the dialectical 
process of mutual constitution between human and non-human entities. The ways in 
which we make sense of a book are inescapably entangled with its material forms. It 
is here, in the materiality of meaning-production, that one is to find the symmetry, or 
rather, the dialectic, between people and things.  
 However, books are special things. One characteristic that makes books 
special is that, despite their ubiquity, our understanding of them as sociological 
objects remains limited. We sociologists tend to take books for granted. Much more 
attention is given to the individuals who wrote them, to the ideas included in them, or 
the institutional factors that shape their production and dissemination, than to books 
themselves as objects, or, if you prefer, as things. The thing we call a ‘book’ has a 
well-documented history. But what books do, the ways in which they shape and drive 
interaction, is still very little understood. A book is not written by the author whose 
name appears on its cover. A book is not written at all. Books, as Roger Stoddard 
observes, are manufactured by: ‘scribes and other artisans, by mechanics and other 
engineers, and by printing presses and other machines’ (cited in Chartier 1994:9). 
Books are the product of the collective work of this specialized ensemble of writers, 
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printers, and publishers. Independently of their paper or electronic form, books 
provide one type of physical support that offers a text for reading. No ‘work’ exists 
independently of the forms in which it reaches its reader. As a result, books have 
agency. First of all, the book’s format shapes the way a text is appropriated by a given 
public. For instance, seemingly unimportant formal changes have been shown to have 
a dramatic impact upon the book’s audience (e.g. McKenzie 1999). Moreover, books 
perform new readabilities and new publics. A good example is the colportage editions 
of already published texts rendered into new forms in order to reach a more popular 
readership (e.g. Chartier 1995:22). Once we turn from the book’s message or the 
intention behind it, or the external factors shaping it, these are but a few examples of 
the book as a means to read, that is, of the materiality of the text. To separate this 
from the textuality of the book, however, would signify turning a blind eye to the 
materiality of meaning-production that I wish to explore in this paper. My argument 
applies to books generally, i.e. I argue that the meaning of any given book emerges 
from the dialectic between content, context, and form – which includes any form of 
media, from print editions (hardbound, paperback, pocket-size or large folios) to 
digital forms.
7
 Any variation in the form of the book, like any variation in its content 
or in any of the relevant contexts, is likely to have an effect on the meaning of the 
book. A book is a thing and a text, an object and a discourse. This dialectic is 
activated every time the book encounters a new reader. Every instance of reading and 
interpretation changes both reader and book – hence the order of discourse of which 
the book is but one inscription. This is how, from a pragmatic perspective, institutions 
arise and develop. Scientific disciplines, for example, are shaped in no small degree 
by the accumulated effects of the circulation of books among communities of 
interpreters. In short, to paraphrase Chartier, there is no ‘order of discourse’ without 
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an ‘order of books’.8 It is in this precise sense that I talk about the materiality of 
meaning-production. The ‘order of books’ is an instance of the materiality of the 
‘order of discourse’, a materiality that is integral to its existence and subsistence as an 
‘order of discourse’.  
 This insight structures the paper as follows. In Section 1 I review the literature 
on book history, material culture studies, and the sociology of texts. In Section 2 I 
discuss the dialectical relationship between material form and meaning-production by 
reference to the work of G.H. Mead. In Section 3 I explore the implications of 
merging form and meaning. The conclusion offers an illustration of the approach: I 
show how the puzzle of the simultaneous decanonization of Tocqueville’s Democracy 
in America in sociology and its canonization in political science can be resolved by 
looking at struggles over the control of meaning of successive material incarnations of 
the book. 
 
SECTION 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The issue of the materiality of meaning-production, namely the dialectic between the 
book and the text, has been studied from various perspectives in the past. In this 
section I review these approaches vis-à-vis my own pragmatic perspective. The first 
approach has been developed by historians interested in the history of the book. Book 
history, in French histoire du livre, has a long and distinguished history, a history with 
at least two distinct paths of development. In England and the United States, there is 
the ‘descriptive’ or ‘analytical bibliography’ developed in the mid-twentieth century 
around the goal of rigorously studying the materiality of print with a view to 
identifying the least corrupted version of the text, that closest to the author’s original 
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intentions. This included analysing differences in type, paper, ink, and so on (e.g. 
McKerrow 1927; Greg 1950; Bowers 1950). In France, however, a different model 
was pursued. The aim of traditional historiens du livre such as Lucien Febvre includes 
not only describing the material form of books, but also providing detailed 
quantitative descriptions of the printing, commercial, and readership aspects of their 
history (e.g. Febvre and Martin 1950). For the best part of the twentieth century, the 
history of books: ‘was thus a history with neither readers nor authors’ (Chartier 
1994:26).  
 Things began to change in the late 1960s. The primarily descriptive 
approaches to the book that had dominated the field began to be challenged and were 
eventually replaced by post-positivist approaches (Finkelstein and McCleery 2005). In 
the Anglo-Saxon context, this is illustrated by Robert Darnton’s book history, in 
particular, the idea of a ‘communications circuit’ uniting authors, publishers, editors, 
printers, and readers around the production and commercialization of printed texts 
(Darnton 1982:67; see also Grafton 1997). In France, Barthes and Foucault’s 
celebrated thesis of the ‘death of the author’ performed a key role in shifting the focus 
from authorial intention to the endlessly creative ways readers appropriate texts 
(Barthes 1968; Foucault 1977). This gestalt switch from producers to consumers 
eventually led to the development of the post-positivist histoire du livre of the 1980s 
and 1990s, which, rather than assuming a creatively omnipotent reader, analyses 
readership as a social practice (Chartier 1989b:48).  
 The publication of books is now increasingly understood as a collective 
process involving a large number of agents located between the genius of the author 
and the capacity of the reader, whose activity is animated by the tension between the 
materiality of the text and the textuality of the book. A more critical line of empirical 
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inquiry has focused upon the exercise and criticism of power in book production. 
Taking its inspiration from the critical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, especially his 
analysis of the intellectual field, a growing number of book historians have turned 
their attention to the order of authority behind the publication of books (e.g. Chartier 
1995:21).  
 The pragmatic approach to books adopted here has affinities with this goal of 
unmasking taken-for-granted power relations, especially when this concerns 
disciplinary forms of power. The fact remains, however, that historians of the book 
are primarily interested in documenting, describing, and: ‘bringing into the same 
history everyone who contributes, each one in his or her own place and role, to the 
production, dissemination, and interpretation of discourse’ (Chartier 1995:1). 
Providing a social-theoretical explanation of a book’s peregrinations in the world, 
including its effects, remains a secondary goal. For that, one needs to move beyond 
history towards anthropology, where ‘material culture’ studies have been responsible 
for a re-examination of the social life of things since the early 1980s.
9
 
 Anthropology’s turn to things was partly motivated by a rediscovery of 
Hegel’s analysis of the subject-object relation in The Phenomenology of the Spirit. In 
a Hegelian fashion, physical objects, or things, are understood to make us in the same 
process as we make them. We become persons through the production, exchange, and 
return of things; this is how culture comes about. But material things are not only 
produced. Their exchange, as the Malinowski-Mauss theory of culture explains, 
provides the basis for most social relationships. This basis is debt, that is, the debt 
those who receive things incur vis-à-vis those who give those things. There is hardly a 
more solid bond upon which to build a social relationship than the moral obligation 
not to remain in debt, of returning the gift. The upshot of this theory of gift is that, as 
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Daniel Miller, leader of the UCL school of material culture studies, explains: ‘we do 
not start from what societies do with things, it is the circulation of things that creates 
society. Or better still, what we call society and stuff are actually artificial separations 
out of the same process’ (2010:67).  
Once we apply this neo-Hegelian insight to the circulation of books, we 
realize that the question is not what we do with them. Rather, the issue is the ways in 
which making, growing up with, and taking the book-as-thing for granted makes us 
part of a new type of society. Producing and consuming books manufactures a new 
version of us. It is in this sense that the transition from the manuscript to the print 
book between the end of the Middle Ages and the eighteenth century has been 
associated with the rise of ‘authorial self-consciousness’ (Brown 1991:142), or what 
Foucault designated ‘author-function’ ([1969] 1991:108; see also Eisenstein 1979). 
The author, and subsequently copyright, are socio-juridical entities made possible by 
the creation of the print book. But the invention of the print book did not simply 
create the figure of the author. Around this new object gradually emerged an entirely 
new connection between authors and texts. This was a key development in making us 
part of a society that, for the first time, understands itself as a book-reading society. 
To explain this key historical innovation, however, we need to move beyond 
anthropology. Anthropologists, even theoretically sophisticated examples such as 
Miller, aim not to explain as much as they seek to describe as vividly as possible how 
culture comes about through the dialectical relationship between things and persons.  
 Miller’s material culture studies, of course, are but the latest of a series of 
encounters with Hegel going back to the nineteenth century. In turn of the twentieth 
century Chicago, for instance, G.H. Mead subjected Hegel’s subject-object relation in 
The Phenomenology to a thoroughly post-metaphysical and naturalistic re-
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examination. The outcome of this re-examination, that is, Mead’s social pragmatism 
(Silva 2006, 2007, 2008), is the main source of the pragmatic approach to books I 
advocate here.  
Yet Mead’s social pragmatism, with a few notable exceptions, has been 
largely absent from the spectacular ‘pragmatist turn’ that French social theory has 
undertaken since the 1990s (Madelrieux 2008). The main sources for recent 
explorations of the semiotics of materiality by French pragmatic sociology have been 
James and Dewey, as well as Durkheim, Mauss, and Tarde. A case in point is the self-
proclaimed ‘Jamesian, Deweyan, pragmatist’ (2006:115) Bruno Latour and his Actor-
Network-Theory (ANT) (1985). ANT, namely Latour’s notion of immutable mobiles, 
has served as inspiration for Lindsay Prior’s pragmatic sociology of documentation 
(2008), whose basic tenets are very close to my own in this paper. This pragmatic 
emphasis upon the agency of things questions the traditional sociological ascription of 
explanatory power to entities such as the state, culture, productive forces, or social 
groups. Rather, inscriptions are to be conceived of as immutable mobiles whose 
circulation and accumulation make those entities possible in the first place (Latour 
2011:429). Hence sociologists should direct their attention to the history of the 
circulation of immutable mobiles, from the accumulation of records and ideograms 
that made the Chinese Empire possible, to the performation of today’s market 
economy by marginalist economic formulae (Callon 2009:330). If French pragmatists 
suggest that we retrace the social biography of immutable mobiles across networks of 
socio-technical agencements, including important performation struggles (Callon 
2009:332), in a parallel yet independent British development, D.F. McKenzie finds in 
pragmatism the resources to redefine bibliography. With McKenzie, bibliography 
ceases to be a Platonic quest for the essential text transcending all of its possible 
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material incarnations, and becomes a pragmatic inquiry into exactly those material 
incarnations (1969).
10
  
 For McKenzie, a text (from the Latin, texere, ‘to weave’) is a process of 
material construction through which a web of words is woven into a meaningful 
whole (1999:14). From this perspective, authorship is dispersed and collective rather 
than unified and singular. It includes all those involved in the process of material 
construction of a text and its meanings (1999: 26-27). Texts can take many forms, 
including that of a print book. Texts are therefore relatively independent of the 
documents, which at any particular moment give them form. No text yields a 
definitive meaning. As a language, the form and meaning of any given text derives 
from other texts. The multiple metamorphoses, the various physical forms of any 
given text, are to be conceived as its condition of survival, rather than an 
insurmountable obstacle between the reader and the absolute and immutable meaning 
of a text. In turn, McKenzie explains, these metamorphoses ‘alone make possible, in 
their sequence, any account of cultural change’, concluding that: ‘from a 
bibliographical point of view, therefore, the ostensible contradiction between those 
two concepts of ‘text’, the closed and the open, simply dissolves’ (1999: 61).  
 Finally, in its understanding that books are (also) a form of media, pragmatic 
sociology joins Friedrich Kittler’s post-structuralist discourse analysis of texts as 
material communicative events in historically contingent networks connecting writers, 
typists, editors, and interpreters.
11
 But unlike Kittler, who sees no problem in 
recovering Heidegger’s account of the relationship between hand and typewriter 
(1999: 198-200), or Carl Schmitt’s philosophical meditation on the Buribunks (a 
diary-typing machine) (1999: 231-242), I remain sceptical about the postmodernist 
tendency to avoid questions of power, inequality, and domination in the production of 
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knowledge. If anything, a pragmatic genealogy aims at exposing precisely those 
structurally unequal power struggles over the production and control of meaning that 
conservative thinking (in both its anti-modern or postmodernist versions) either 
endorse or ignore.  
 The pragmatic approach to the book I articulate here draws upon all four 
perspectives reviewed above. It involves a genealogical concern with disciplinary 
forms of power, a dialectical understanding of the subject-object relationship, a 
semiotic-iterative account of cultural change that takes materiality seriously, and a 
consideration for books as a form of media. Yet it differs from all of the above by 
using a problem-solving conception of agency. Drawing upon Mead’s social 
pragmatism, I ask not what an author is, but, in characteristically pragmatic fashion, 
to what extent meaning-making practices (such as writing, translating, editing, 
teaching or commenting upon a book) are better understood as socio-technical 
entanglements.  
 
SECTION 2. G.H. MEAD’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF THE BOOK 
 
The relationship between pragmatism and books is, of course, an old affair. The 
opposition between pragmatism and Platonism has shaped debates among literary 
critics, cultural historians, and intellectuals for the best part of the twentieth century. 
One of the latest renditions of this opposition has been the neo-conservative lament 
for American intellectual decline in the 1980s. In The Closing of the American Mind, 
literary critic Allan Bloom points to the ‘failure to read good books’ (1987:64) as one 
reason for this decline. The reason for Bloom’s lament was the gradual demise of the 
‘Great Books’ tradition on American campuses, a Platonist pedagogical model the 
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origins of which can be traced back to pre-Depression America (Bird and Musial, 
1973). A key figure in the creation and development of the Great Books tradition was 
Robert Maynard Hutchins, who devoted his tenure as President of the University of 
Chicago (1929-1951) to the advancement of this pedagogical model. Hutchins’s 
conservative agenda was confronted with tremendous resistance by the University, 
however. One of the protagonists of the resistance was Mead who, first as member 
and then as chair of the philosophy department, was to play a central role in what 
became known as the ‘Hutchins controversy’ (Cook 1993:183-193).  
 The Hutchins controversy concerned the replacement of pragmatism by a 
conservative blend of Aristotelianism and Thomism as the main philosophical 
orientation of the department, as well as of the University generally. Concretely, it 
involved the appointment in 1930-1931 of like-minded philosophers Mortimer J. 
Adler, who was to play a vital role in the Great Books initiative, Richard McKeon, 
and Scott Buchanan, against the will of the more senior members of the philosophy 
department. The clash between Hutchins and Mead was inevitable. Mead’s 
reservations concerning Hutchins’s agenda were both ideological and philosophical. 
Ideologically, Mead opposed the elitist and culturally conservative character of the 
Great Books tradition. This way of conceiving of books – ‘[t]he best that has been 
thought and written’ – in the words of Matthew Arnold (cited by Bird and Musial, 
1973:160), involves introducing the best students in small group discussions to the 
eternal truths which are believed to inhabit certain texts. Few things could be further 
from the preferences of a radical democratic thinker such as Mead, who spent decades 
fighting for progressive causes such as the rights of women, immigrants, and manual 
workers, and whose pedagogical thinking favoured concrete problem-solving, rather 
than debating abstractions (Shalin 1989). Philosophically, Mead rejects the 
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essentialist thesis that books are no more than little parallelepipeds which act as 
vessels for certain ‘eternal truths’. For a pragmatist such as Mead, of course, to sever 
the soul of a book from its body is to miss the point entirely. Unmoved by these 
reasons, Hutchins went ahead with the appointments. Incensed by the escalation of 
events, Mead eventually resigned and died shortly afterwards.  
 Mead’s demise in April 1931 signalled both the end of an era, that of the 
Chicago school of pragmatism, and the beginning of another, that of symbolic 
interactionism. The book Mind, Self, and Society (1934) played a central role in 
establishing Mead as the main intellectual lodestone of this phenomenologically-
oriented sociological perspective. The troubled history of this (creatively edited) 
book, however, has meant, among other things, that the Mead one finds here is 
hopelessly Platonic, with little to say about how the materiality of things is an integral 
part of the subject’s process of social constitution. This helps to explain why at the 
Panizzi Lectures of 1985, McKenzie finds in the pragmaticism of Charles Sanders 
Peirce a crucial resource for the Platonism he wishes to dispense with (1999: 9-10), 
but is virtually silent as to Mead’s contributions to the project of building a pragmatic 
‘sociology of texts’ as an alternative to positivist approaches to the book. Fortunately, 
an alternative, more pragmatic portrait of Mead has recently emerged with the 
publication of an anthology of his writings in 2011. In previously unpublished texts 
such as ‘On the Self and Teleological Behavior’ or ‘On Social Consciousness and 
Social Science’, we see Mead following in the footsteps of Hegel’s theory of 
objectification, yet resisting Marx’s one-sided interpretation of it as fetishism, a 
suspicion that would persist throughout the twentieth century in the Frankfurtian 
strand of critical thinking from Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of the 
Enlightenment (1944) to Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964). Avoiding this 
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suspicion of material culture as materialism enables Mead to take the materiality of 
culture seriously without receding into the idealism of Platonic solutions.  
 Mead accomplishes this by his unique understanding of pragmatist 
philosophy. Mead’s pragmatism is a social pragmatism, i.e. both a thoroughly inter-
subjective process philosophy entirely compatible with the principles of the scientific 
experimental method (setting Mead apart from James and Dewey), and a progressive 
world-view at home with radical democracy (placing him closer to Dewey).  
 As a process philosophy, Mead’s social pragmatism is at odds with dualistic 
modes of thinking from Platonism to modern Cartesian philosophy, with its 
characteristic ontological distinctions between mind and body, or between thought 
and action. According to such dualistic philosophies, things can be studied 
independently of the uses people give them and, conversely, ideas, beliefs, and 
practices can be studied separately from the environment in which they play out. By 
contrast, for Mead, human agents are fundamentally problem-solvers and thought’s 
main function is to guide social action to the solution of practical problems that 
confront individuals in their dealings with the environment. A number of important 
and wide-ranging epistemological implications follow from this claim. Most 
important in the present context, however, is Mead’s corollary that individuals, while 
responding to problematic situations, engage with the environment in a relationship of 
‘mutual determination’. It is such a ‘mutual interrelationship of the individuals and 
their environments’ (2011:27) that accounts for the characteristics that define objects. 
For Mead, then, persons and things, individuals and books do not live separate lives. 
Rather, they mutually determine one another. The implication of this philosophical 
insight for the sociological study of books is obvious. Pragmatic sociology needs to 
approach the lives of books and the lives of people as fundamentally entangled.  
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 As a radical democratic world-view, pragmatism rejects elitist and culturally 
conservative solutions to social and political issues. Hence Mead’s heartfelt reaction 
to Hutchins’s agenda. Yet Mead’s social theory lacks an adequate understanding of 
power relations as constitutive of the social bond. This is not to say, however, that he 
systematically neglected processes of material reproduction of societies as he did 
study at length the nature and consequences of warfare, citizenship, urbanization, and 
emigration. That is to say that, in all these processes, Mead studied conflict, violence, 
and coercion as failed human attempts at ‘rational reconstruction’, rather than as 
positive social phenomena in their own right (e.g. Silva 2008: 167-175). Hence 
Mead’s ultimately horizontal, non-hierarchical conception of the social order, 
including the order of books.  
 This much is clear from Mead’s conception of objects and human agency. For 
Mead, a book is an object insofar as one is able to act upon it (1938:430). But do we 
approach a book as we approach the memory of a book? Do we talk about books we 
have read as we talk about books we have not read? For Mead, such distinctions are 
not categorical, but matters of degree (2011:25). This is because Mead distinguishes 
between books as social objects and books as physical objects. A book is a physical 
object with certain properties and functions, such as weight, resistance, and so on. Yet 
in order to be a physical object, Mead argues, a book must first be a social object, i.e. 
a book must have a common meaning to participants in the social act. At first, human 
organisms interact socially with the surrounding environment and the objects of 
which it is composed. An organism’s immediate response to an inanimate physical 
object is the same as that organism’s response to another organism. For instance, I 
order a book from Amazon because I find it interesting or useful, or a combination of 
both. But once I have the book in my hands and read it, I abstract from that type of 
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immediate response because of what I come to know of it. I may still find it 
interesting or useful, but now I have reasons to think that way. There are, then, two 
different moments when we deal with physical objects. Our immediate response is 
social while our later reaction is abstract and rational. What explains the passage from 
one moment to the other is the human hand. In more than one sense, then, books as 
physical things are the product of the human hand. 
 
SECTION 3. A PRAGMATIC SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE BOOK 
 
For Mead, books have agency not because of their thing-ness, as suggested by 
contemporary materiality studies, but because of their sociality.
12
 They have an 
impact on the world because they are first and foremost social objects; only then do 
they subsequently emerge as physical objects, as things. Books as things, no less than 
books as social objects, are thoroughly inter-subjective entities. They emerge as a 
result of people’s engagement with the environment in a relationship of mutual 
determination. To stress the dialectics of the mutual determination between 
individuals and the environment is to emphasize the generative, creative nature of 
such mutuality. Mead writes that, from this dialectical relation, arises a: ‘coordination 
in the structure of the organism of the individual which is also new – as new as the 
object’ (2011:38). In other words, from the tension between individuals and objects 
arise new individuals and new objects. New individuals arise as the self readjusts to 
the emergence of a new object. Modern individuals, for example, emerged as new 
scientific, political, and social objects gradually came about. Illustrating this thesis 
using the Copernican revolution, the ‘earlier objects were the earth at the center of the 
world’, whereas the ‘later objects were the sun at the center of a system of planets’ 
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(2011:41), Mead argues that, from the standpoint of ‘religion, politics, education, and 
art there was a new world and a new society that had not existed before’ (2011:40-
41).  
The same reasoning, of course, applies to books. Consider a print copy of the 
King James Bible. This version of the Bible exists as a physical object with particular 
characteristics such as weight, resistance, colour, odour, and so on insofar as it 
becomes embodied in the responses of the individuals manipulating them. It is this 
‘embodiment of the object’ in the responses of the individual that is: ‘the essential 
factor in the emergence of the physical thing’ (Mead 1932:125; see also Hodder 
2012:38). As the Bible emerged in the world, first as a social object, then as a 
physical one, it became embodied in the responses of the individuals manipulating it. 
To a large extent, one becomes a Christian insofar as one embodies the Bible in one’s 
conduct. Crucially, however, different versions of the Bible are embodied in one’s 
conduct in different ways. This much had been noted long ago by John Locke, as D.F. 
McKenzie rightly recalls. Locke’s argument in his 1707 An Essay for the 
Understanding of St. Paul’s Epistles on the Bible is that controlling the form of the 
text means to control its interpretation and uses. More concretely, Locke believes that, 
if the Bible were to be published as a continuous text rather than as a succession of 
verses, it would prevent much hermeneutical confusion and self-serving misuse. 
However, the current (verse) form of the Bible can be said to: ‘even indeed generate 
religious and civil dissension’ (McKenzie 1999: 57). McKenzie uses Locke’s 
argument to illustrate his thesis that ‘form effects meaning’, a thesis that has proved 
immensely influential among those interested in exploring the materiality of print 
culture, myself included.  
McKenzie’s pragmatic sociology of books can be criticized, however, on at 
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least two counts. The first has to do with the issue of power and it takes us beyond 
pragmatism and Mead towards genealogy. Genealogy, as practiced by Nietzsche and 
the late Foucault (1971, 1984), is the exact opposite of tracing a pedigree. Rather than 
using the past to seek or enhance the legitimacy of a present person, practice, or 
institution, to give a genealogy, aims at showing the ‘overwhelming contingency’ that 
characterizes history as the result of: ‘violent forms of human action based on 
pervasive delusions’ (Geuss 1999:5). Pragmatism, either in its Meadian form or in the 
version suggested by McKenzie, is not primarily oriented at exposing such delusions. 
Yet the only alternative to mythologizing the past, or reducing it to an ultimately 
meaningless succession of ‘facts’, is to give a genealogy of successive attempts by 
various individual and collective agents to take control of and reinterpret certain 
segments of reality, thereby imposing on those segments a certain meaning. In this 
sense, the appropriate historical account is a genealogy. To give a genealogy of these 
successive attempts at producing and controlling meaning, in turn, is to relocate the 
phenomenon of power away from the individual agent’s sphere of intentional action, 
such as in Bertrand Russell’s or Weber’s accounts, and towards the materiality of the 
techniques and mechanisms through which power is exercised in a omnipresent, but 
never omnipotent, way (Geuss 2001:26-27). As such, this genealogical conception of 
power occupies a central position in my attempt at a sociological approach to the 
order of books created and maintained by ‘disciplinary’ forms of power which require 
a certain amount of co-operation to be acquired and exercised.  
The second criticism to be levelled at McKenzie refers to his way of 
conceiving of the relation between form and meaning. For McKenzie, these analytical 
categories are in perennial tension with one another. This is certainly true most of the 
time. Yet in special circumstances, form and meaning relate to each other in a 
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fundamentally different way. An exciting suggestion in this regard can be found in 
Mead’s analysis of the fusion of the acting self (‘the ‘I’) and the self-as-object (the 
‘me’). Like other turn-of-the-century sociological accounts of war and religious 
experience, such as Simmel’s account of war as a liberating existential experience, or 
Durkheim’s understanding of ‘collective effervescence’, Mead teaches us to conceive 
of the possibility of merging analytical categories that were previously thought to be 
separate. If one applies this reasoning to the book, namely its material form and the 
text it supports, one moves beyond McKenzie’s bibliography to face the possibility 
that, under certain exceptional circumstances, form and meaning can merge.  
When form and meaning fuse, books acquire a whole new status. Still physical 
and social objects, their materiality is now social in an entirely new sense. The book 
embodies society’s values. Form becomes meaning as the difference between material 
form and the text dissolves. And if meaning is the word of God, then form is God. 
Allah is embodied in the Koran, as God is embodied in the five books of the Torah. 
Hence the designation of Muslims and Jews, either by themselves or by others, as the 
People of the Book. This much has been amply documented in material culture 
studies, including print culture studies and book history. But my pragmatic approach 
to the book goes a step further.  
 Dewey once wrote that: ‘a problem well put is half solved’ (2008:112). The 
problem with books is that, if they have lives, then surely they can die too. Hence the 
problem with which I conclude this paper – what does it take for a book to die? What 
effect does a book’s death have on our lives? Answering these questions will take us a 
step closer, I believe, to a fuller understanding of how the lives (and deaths) of things 
and persons are fundamentally entangled.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Very much as ‘terroir’ denotes the holistic combination of soil, geology, climate, and 
the local vinicultural practices that make each region’s wine unique, what makes each 
book unique is a holistic combination of agency, form, and meaning. Agency is here 
conceived of as a problem-solving activity, in which subject and object are mutually 
constituted. Once bottled and shipped, wine bottles begin their journey into the world 
of consumption. Likewise, once printed and put on sale, books enjoin their readers 
into networks of meaning, solidarity, rivalry, and cooperation. Of course, one does not 
have to read a book to be able to talk about it. Texts always exceed the material form 
– the codex, the volume, or the computer – that supports them through speech, 
memory, and imagination. As social objects, but also as physical objects, books can 
indeed live long, fascinating lives with tremendous import for the lives of people who 
co-exist with them.  
The death of a book entails its demise as a social object, not as a physical 
object. As long as it subsists as a social object, a book can always be resurrected in 
some other form. Yet a book will die once it ceases to be embodied in our conduct. 
Put simply, if one no longer thinks, talks, or acts towards it. Deeply aware of this, in 
the Chiltan Mount, in Pakistan, Muslims have long buried copies of the Koran, ‘each 
one shrouded, like the dead, in white cloth’ (Battles 2004:193).  
Likewise, one of the most intriguing puzzles in the current historiography of 
academic disciplines involves the death of a book. Why is Tocqueville’s Democracy 
in America (1835-40) dead for sociologists today, while in neighboring political 
science it has never been more alive? As I show elsewhere (Silva 2015; see also Silva 
and Vieira 2011), I believe that unraveling this puzzle involves ‘following the book’ 
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since its origins in the 1830s up to the present day as the inscription device around 
which struggles over the definition and control of the meaning of the work revolved. 
This genealogy draws upon archival and secondary materials pertaining to both 
human and non-human agency, including, among others, the ‘working manuscript’ 
and notes handwritten by Tocqueville in the 1830s and all the editions in English. 
Existing approaches are unable to explain why Democracy (and Tocqueville) has 
been simultaneously canonized in political science and de-canonized in sociology 
(e.g. Mancini 2006; Abbott 2007), because they either assume that the impact of 
Tocqueville’s ideas has been relatively stable or that the text of Democracy is 
constant, and that what requires explanation is the variance of factors external to it, 
from the author’s intentions to changes in the collective understanding of the 
discipline. In reality, however, texts are never constant, and neither is their meaning 
and impact. They are constantly changing. Some of these changes are relatively 
minor, as with the typeface, while others are more substantial, as with certain 
abridged passages. As the material form of the text changes as a result of the cultural 
work of the collective efforts of editors, translators, and commentators, so does its 
meaning – as a result, ‘many Tocquevilles’ have arisen (Nisbet 1976-77). Yet, 
contrary to Nisbet’s self-legitimating genealogy of a succession of Tocquevilles, 
closely mirroring the main grievances of the conservative movement in the United 
States since the New Deal, my pragmatic genealogy of Democracy exposes the 
discontinuous, and often contradictory, nature of the ‘many Tocquevilles’ that have 
arisen since the 1930s in Western social thought. 
Concretely, the unraveling of the dialectic between form and meaning in 
Democracy reveals that, rather than an obvious and natural endpoint, for Tocqueville, 
equality of conditions (or democracy) is a distinctively modern problematic with 
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multiple and often ambivalent consequences. This is why Tocqueville decides to 
include, pace his gentleman’s agreement with Beaumont, the chapter on the three 
races at the end of Part I of the work. In this light, far from being an afterthought as 
some suggest, this chapter emerges as absolutely central to the argument Tocqueville 
was trying to make. Furthermore, it explains why Democracy’s critical analysis of 
equality of conditions resonated so powerfully with postwar social scientists. Crucial 
in this regard were the new translations of the work (the 1945 Bradley and the 1966 
Mayer-Lawrence editions), whose paperback format dramatically increased its 
readership and whose forewords and introductions powerfully framed Democracy as 
the locus classicus of the sociological study of race relations and socio-economic 
inequality in democratic societies (e.g. Drescher 1968). It was out of the fusion 
between this (paperback) format and this (progressively framed) content in the 
(postwar) context that ‘Tocqueville, the sociological classic’ emerges. 
Finally, it sheds light upon the death of Democracy (and Tocqueville) as a 
sociological classic. Parallel to the postwar (progressive) construction of Democracy, 
there was another editorial strand of conservative character. From Commager’s 1945 
edition to the abridged, sanitized versions of the 1950s (Heffner 1956, Hacker 1964; 
see also Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1966), in all of which the three races chapter is deemed 
irrelevant and swiftly excised, one finds Tocqueville being materially constructed as 
the surest antidote to dangerous Marxist political solutions and epistemology. I 
believe that ‘Tocqueville, the analyst of (in)equality’ of the 1950s and 1960s has 
given way to today’s ‘Tocqueville, the neoconservative superhero’ (Kramnick 2003: 
xliv), as this conservative editorial strand assumed control over the material 
production of the meaning of the work through a new wave of re-editions in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. Chief among these is the first new translation, by America’s 
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most influential neoconservative political philosopher Harvey Mansfield (with Debra 
Winthrop, 2000), to appear since the Mayer-Lawrence edition of 1966. 
Unsurprisingly, their discussion of the chapter on the three races not only ignores its 
centrality to Tocqueville’s argument, but is also guided by a concept nowhere to be 
found in the text itself, but which figures in Leo Strauss as the cardinal moral virtue: 
the notion of ‘pride’, ‘the chapter’s unstated theme’ (lviii).  
It is in the cultural work of this collective of neoconservative political 
philosophers-cum-editors that part of the solution to the puzzle of the contrasting 
destinies of Tocqueville in sociology and political science resides. Virtually all recent 
editions of Democracy frame the text as a classic in political science or political 
theory, rather than sociology. More than the product of institutional factors or 
ingenious new interpretations of the work, it is out of the merging between the format 
of the 1990s wave of re-editions and their (conservatively framed) content in the 
context of the political consolidation of the American neoconservative movement 
that, as the New York Times described it, ‘Tocqueville for the NeoCons’ (14 January 
2001) emerged. Much as Mansfield and other American neo-conservatives have been 
actively involved in keeping Democracy alive for political theorists, others, such as 
the Muslims of the Chiltan Mount, go to great lengths to ensure that certain, special 
books will not die. Uniting the cultural work of these Muslims and neo-conservatives 
is, of course, the shared pragmatic realization that texts can only survive with some 
sort of material support. If this is indeed the case, then sociologists have as much to 
say about the history of Democracy in America as the book’s history has to say about 
we sociologists and our practice.  
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Endnotes 
 
                                                        
1
 Yet see Borges (1998:10). 
2
 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers to bring this issue to my attention. 
3
 The annual statistical reports between 2009-10 and 2012-13 by the UK Publishers 
Association shows that losses in print revenues have been partly compensated by the gains 
made from e-books. Non-fiction books (including sociology ones) fit this general pattern, 
with the e-books purchases rising from 11% to 13% between 2012 and 2013. See 
http://www.pik.org.pl/upload/files/Global_Trends_in_Publishing_2014.pdf 
4
 Here I follow David Kastan’s opposition between the pragmatic viewpoint, epitomized by 
Jerome McGann, and the Platonist perspective, advocated by authors such as G. Thomas 
Tanselle (Kastan, 2001, pp.117-118).  
5
 See, e.g., Latour (1993), Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), and Bernstein (2010). 
6
 Post-humanists (or anti-humanists – I use the terms interchangeably) include Donna 
Haraway, Emily Martin, Marilyn Strathern, and Bruno Latour. 
7
 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing this issue to my attention. 
8
 Chartier is here distancing himself from Foucault’s Platonism in works such as The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, where the basic analytical unit is not the book (or the oeuvre) but 
discursive formations (Foucault [1969] 2008:25).  
9
 See Firth (1983), Appadurai (1986), Strathern (1988). On the agency of things, see Olsen 
(2003), Gosden (2005). 
10
 For McKenzie, pragmatism is a materialist approach to texts as sociological and historical 
realities rather than as philosophical or ontological ones. As far as I was able to determine, 
McKenzie does not engage with American philosophical pragmatism in a systematic fashion. 
On McKenzie and pragmatism, see Bland (2008:9). On ‘literary pragmatics’, see McGann 
(1991). 
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11
 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing Kittler’s work to my attention. 
12
 Mead introduces the concept of sociality towards the end of his career with a view to 
systematizing his ideas. It would be anachronistic to suggest, however, that all Mead’s earlier 
work can be read in the light of this principle. I am here using it strictly in the sense Mead 
uses it in The Philosophy of the Present (1932). 
